Service quality is a very important aspect of the water and sewerage industry. Empirical studies have tended to focus on production costs, without explicitly introducing key dimensions of quality.
Introduction
The goal of public utility reform is to improve sector performance. Water utilities present a unique set of issues since they have the characteristics of natural monopolies and are often publicly owned. In developing countries, reforms arise in two ways: regulatory reform and ownership reform. In the regulatory reforms, new commissions have adopted a variety of incentive mechanisms designed to replicate the disciplines of competitive markets.
1 Whether rateofreturn or price cap regulation is adopted, some form of yardstick regulation is often utilized to establish targets and to promote cost containment, network expansion, financial sustainability, and quality of service improvements. The performance record to date is somewhat mixed.
Regulators often do not have the instruments to provide adequate incentives to meet objectives. Nevertheless, benchmarking has become a tool that can be used to inform the public debate over infrastructure improvements. Thus, incorporating service quality into the regulatory evaluation represents a refinement that warrants attention if political leaders, utility managers, and citizens are to have a good understanding of utility performance. For example, quality can be an important issue in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Saal and Parker (2001) showed that TFP change in the water sector in the United Kingdom has been extremely slow in recent years, but the quality has improved significantly because of the large increases in minimum standards.
Improving this dimension of output involved significant costs. Thus, the use of unadjusted TFP change measures during this period would understate the actual TFP improvements.
In the ownership reforms, private participation is often viewed as beneficial for expanding access and for improving operations, but privatization still raises social concerns in many emerging markets. Private investment has lagged in the water and sewerage sector, where (1) technological change has lagged (relative to energy and telecommunications), (2) the majority of the assets are fixed and longlived, (3) current prices are often below operating costs, (4) political barriers to reform are strong, and (5) With regulatory and ownership reforms, benchmarking (or yardstick competition) becomes an important tool for evaluating the effectiveness of the reforms and comparing the relative performance of different companies within the sector. Rankings help inform the public, directing attention toward poorly performing utilities and providing information to policymakers and regulators regarding deviations from best practice. In addition to traditional measures of technical efficiency, service quality is a performance indicator that warrants attention. 2 The World
Commission on Water estimated that mitigating water and sanitation problems (which often affect public health) would require US$600800 billion between 2000 and 2010 (Clark et al. 2004 . To examine the benefits of incorporating quality variables into benchmarking, this paper uses stochastic cost frontier models to illustrate how performance rankings might be affected
Literature Review
Relative and absolute rankings can become catalysts for better stewardship of water and other resources. With increasing demand, rising public expectations, and natural experiments 2 Foster (2005) emphasizes qualityofservice regulation (especially potability, pressure, and continuity) as a complement to price regulation.
(reforms), scholars are beginning to explore the impact of regulation, franchise competition, and privatization on infrastructure performance and efficiency. Less attention has been given to water, partly because of data availability issues. Recent studies draw upon data from developed and developing countries.
Literature in developed countries: Scholars in the United Kingdom have given substantial attention to the water sector. Hunt and Lynk (1995) , Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998) , and Ashton (2000) focus on estimating the efficiency of water utilities using a variety of techniques. Hunt and Lynk examine the extent to which the integrated authorities benefited from joint production by using a dynamic multiproduct cost function based on UK panel data from 1979/801987/88.
Cubbin and Tzanidakis compare the results of analyses utilizing DEA and regression analysis.
Ashton calculates the relative efficiency of ten privatized UK water and sewerage companies between 1987 and 1997, using a fixedeffect cost function with data from England and Wales.
More recently, Saal and Parker (2000, 2001) underscore the importance of quality issues. They check the impact of privatization and regulation on the productivity growth and total cost of the water sector in England and Wales using quality adjusted outputs (adjusted by indices of the relative quality of drinking water and sewerage treatment). Some of their recent working papers (Saal and Scott (2004); Saal et al. (2004) and Saal and Parker (2005) ) also use the quality adjusted variables in the estimation of translog cost functions and input distance functions.
3 3 A number of studies of U.S. water utilities are summarized in Wallsten and Kosec (2005 improvements in service quality have made a significant contribution to sector's total productivity change. They argue that integrating quality of service in regulatory benchmarking is preferable to costonly approaches.
In addition to empirical studies, 4 there are numerous theoretical analyses of service quality.
Sappington (2005) provides a comprehensive survey of the theoretical literature regarding the design of service quality regulation in public utility industries. In a very simple setting (single dimension of quality, q), he summarizes why an unregulated monopoly will not necessarily deliver the welfaremaximizing level of quality. Theoretically, the unregulated monopolist will 4 Estache et al. (2005) provide a comprehensive survey of the recent productivity and efficiency literature in infrastructure industries (energy, ports, railways, roads, telecommunications and water& sewerage) in developing countries.
supply more than welfaremaximizing level of quality if the marginal customer values additional quality more highly than do inframarginal customers on average. In practice, excess supply of quality may be a potential problem in developed country. However, this result is unlikely in a developing country such as Peru. As we will see in the following sections, water availability are service coverage are very poor in Peru compared to the developed country. To improve service quality is a very important objective for the Peruvian water regulator.
This paper extends the current literature in service quality research of water industry. Like
Corton (2003), the present study examines the performance of the publiclyowned water utilities (Empresas Proveedoras de Servicios-EPS) regulated by SUNASS in Peru. 5 Using data from 19962001, this study attempts to determine whether the inclusion of quality indicators into the estimation affects the benchmarking results.
Background and model specification
Policymakers and water regulators in Peru face problems of inadequate system maintenance, a high level of unaccountedfor water, excess staff, low metering rates, and low water quality. The lack of readily available comparative data about quality, operation costs, prices, quantity, and service coverage makes it hard for customers to exert pressure on the water utility managers to 5 The dependent variable in Corton's regression model is operation cost; the independent variables are volume of water produced, the length of mains measured in kilometers, the number of districts administered by each company and two dummies for regions. One drawback of the model is that the input prices are not included in the cost function. Second, the estimation is based on the deterministic model, which assumes that all deviations of individual firm performance from the frontier are attributable to inefficiency rather than to random factors beyond the managers' control. Third, service quality differences are omitted.
improve their performance. In late 1999, SUNASS established a benchmark system under the guidance of a World Bank consulting group as a first step toward informing citizens and political leaders about the relative performance of the municipal utilities. The group selected nine indicators, grouping them into four areas of efficiency. 
Managerial Finance Efficiency is defined by the ratio of direct costs and other expenses
to revenues.
The first two broad areas of efficiency represent the interests of society. The third reflects the companies' performance, and the fourth represents the citizenowner's perspective. Each of the nine subindicators was assigned a weight of 1 as a first step in the benchmarking process.
Each indicator expressed as a percentage is multiplied by its weight and added to the percentage total per company. This total per company is divided by nine, the number of indicators.
3
There are some potential problems with this approach to evaluating performance. With an equal weight of 1 assigned to each of the nine indicators, there is no differentiation among the different performance dimensions, although some are (presumably) more highly valued than others. More importantly, most indicators in the SUNASS scheme lack 6 inputoutput causative relationships. Only the managerial efficiency category considers the cost issue. The basic definition of productivity is equal to outputs/inputs (where identifying the weights and addressing index number issues raises analytical problems). The benchmarking scheme in Peru is actually outputoriented and does not incorporate inputs in a comprehensive manner.
In this study, the stochastic cost frontier models will be used to explore the impact of service quality variables on the firm efficiency evaluation. Cost depends on input prices technology and outputs (where the production technology determines the appropriate levels of inputs). For this study, total cost is calculated from the SUNASS database by adding cost of sales, sales expense, administrative expense, financial cost and depreciation (the sum serves as an approximation for annual capital costs). The outputs are those used in many water studies: volume of water billed and the number of customers. Because volume of water billed is highly correlated with revenue, it is not included as an output.
The two input prices are wage and capital price. The wage is calculated by total outlays on labor divided by the number of employees. The number of the employees is equal to the sum of the permanent workers and contract workers. Because all the water utilities in Peru are 6 For more detail information about Peru water sector, readers are referred to Corton (2003) and Foster government owned, excessive labor may be a serious problem due to weak managerial incentives for cost containment and interference by local politicians. The mean value of the ratio of staff per 1000 connections is 6.04, which is significantly higher than the mean value of the ratio (2.1) in developed countries, although relative input prices also differ across countries (Tynan and Kingdom 2002) .
The price of capital is perhaps the most difficult variable to calculate for cost functions in developing countries. The rental price of capital can be approximated by annual capital outlays divided by the capital stock. These outlays are not new capacity investments but returns required for financial sustainability. In this study, capital outlays are approximated by adding depreciation and financial cost (interest payments). Either the network length or the number of water connections can be used as the proxy for cumulative capital investment (stock of capital).
The number of connections is used as a proxy for capital stock since there is a serious problem with missing data for network length in 199697. The ratio should reflect relative price of capital across utilities even though there are, no doubt, measurement errors for this variable. Because of a lack of data on fuel, chemicals, and power and material costs, the model does not impose the restriction of homogeneity of degree one in prices for estimation purposes.
Quality of service is another potential output or control variable since a firm can always lower its costs by reducing its service quality. Service quality is quite heterogeneous and, in general, relatively low. Four variables are used to capture different dimensions of service quality:
Accountedfor water ratio, positive rate of chlorine tests, service coverage and service continuity.
The accountedfor water ratio is equal to 1 minus the unaccountedfor water ratio-the difference between water supplied and water sold as a percentage of water supplied. As Tynan and Kingdom (2002) monetary unit variables (both the cost and price variables) have been adjusted by using the GDP Deflator. The variables are summarized in Table 1 . 
Estimation and results

Stochastic cost frontier model
The cost frontier is chosen because it can accommodate multiple outputs easily; the frontier approach recognizes that not all utilities try to minimize their costs for reaching a given output level.
The stochastic cost frontier can be expressed as
where y i is the scalar output of producer i, i=1,…, N, w i is an input price vector faced by producer i, ) , , (
is the cost frontier common to all producers, which determines the minimum cost achievable for a given set of outputs, input prices and control variables. b is a vector of technology parameters to be estimated. In the stochastic cost frontier, the error term can be decomposed in two parts in order to incorporate producerspecific random shocks into the analysis.
where u i is a positive onesided disturbance that captures the effect of inefficiency and v i is a symmetric disturbance that reflects the random shocks on each producer. By taking the natural logarithms of both sides, equation (1) can be written as: Different distribution models are tested in the study in order to reduce the impact of choosing a specific distribution function arbitrarily. Battese and Coelli (1995) proposed a conditional mean efficiency model based on a truncated normal model to identify some of the reasons for differences in predicted efficiencies among firms in an industry. The model can be expressed as:
where i m is the mean parameter of the truncated normal distribution of the truncated normal model, z i is a vector of environmental variables, which may influence the efficiency of a firm, and d is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Coelli et al. (1999) suggest that the literature offers two alternative approaches to the inclusion of the environmental variables. One assumes that environmental factors influence the shape of the technology and hence that these factors should be included directly into the cost functions as regressors. The other approach assumes that environmental factors directly influence the degree of technical efficiency and hence should be included in equation (4). Both of these forms are tested
here. The quality variables are considered either as environmental variables that may influence the efficiency of a firm or as additional outputs of the cost function. Caudill et al. (1995) In this study, m is the proxy for firm sizelog of number of connections.
Battese and Coelli（1992）proposed the timevariant models to deal with the panel data in SFA analysis. However, as Coelli et al. (2003) point out, the timevarying efficiency model restricts the technical efficiency of all firms so that they follow the same trend direction; that is, either all increasing over time or all decreasing over time, which is unlikely to be valid in many instances. In the time invariant models (fixed effect, random effect and MLE models), the inefficiency is assumed to be constant over time. Since this study uses a sixyear panel, this assumption seems unrealistic. Therefore, on that basis of recommendations by Coelli et al.(2003) and Estache et al. (2004) , a time trend is added to the cost function to capture the technical change, and the equation 8 can be expressed as:
Estimation result:
First, we estimate the frontier model without quality variables. Because all three models (with different error specifications) yield similar results, only the results of the halfnormal model are reported here (Table 2) . From the results we can see that all the coefficients of outputs and input prices are significant and consistent with economic theory: more outputs or higher input prices will result in higher costs. The coefficient of the time trend variable is insignificant, which suggests the absence of technological change over this time period. From the results, it also appears that the variance of the inefficiency term is a function of firm size, since size exerts a 8 A detailed description of the maximum likelihood estimation procedure and loglikelihood function is available in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) . Although the translog function is a flexible functional form often used in SFA studies, it frequently violates the assumption required in the cost function, such as monotonicity or concavity. Furthermore, translog functions can create a multicollinearity problem, which influences the statistical significance of the model. In fact, the present study finds very serious multicollinearity problems from the correlation matrix of the interactive terms. Many correlations exceed 0.8 even 0.9. More importantly, given our sample size, the translog functional form consumes too many degrees of freedom (there would be 44 interactive terms in this case). Therefore, the CobbDouglas log linear form is adopted in this study. significant and negative impact on the variance of inefficiency. Next, a panel data conditional mean efficiency model is estimated to check the impact of quality indicators on water utility efficiency. Again, the coefficients of outputs and input prices are significant and consistent with economic theory: more outputs or higher input prices will result in higher costs. The coefficient of the log connection is negative and significant, which reflects the decrease of inefficiency with the size of the utility. Three of the four quality indicator coefficients are positive, which means that the improvements in quality raise cost. However, none of the four coefficients is statistically significant, as shown in Table 3 . Therefore, it may not be appropriate to treat the quality variables as environmental variables. Wald test performed, with the null hypothesis that all four coefficients of the quality variables are equal to zero simultaneously. Both tests reject the null hypothesis at the 0.01 level. Therefore, quality outputs should not be ignored in the cost frontier.
The four models described here are all used to determine whether the inclusion of quality variables changes the benchmarking result. For simplicity, consider the relative performance of utilities in 2001. The efficiency values and rankings for the four models are reported in Table 5 . Table 6 are similar across models, but the different specifications have significant impacts for some firms.
Thus, a full analysis would look at trends over time and create groupings of firms (based on efficiency parameters), so undue emphasis is not given to ordinal rankings. proceedings, great care must be taken to avoid unduly penalizing utilities (and managers) who seem to have high costs but provide higher levels of service quality. A key issue is how to incentivize managers to move their firms to the frontier. SUNASS does not have mechanisms for rewarding or penalizing poorly performing firms, other than "naming and shaming" the latter.
The issue then becomes one of how robust the rankings are to alternative model specifications.
Ultimately, policy problem becomes one of comparing the incremental costs and benefits of further service quality improvements (including the weight to be given to misclassifying some percentage of the firms).
Concluding Observations and extensions:
Benchmarking has becomes a very important tool for a number of purposes:
· evaluating the effectiveness of the reforms over time,
· comparing the relative performance of different companies within a sector, · informing citizens so they can exert pressure for improved performance, and · providing information to regulatory bodies, helping them improve incentives.
Empirical studies are beginning to provide insights into cost drivers and performance comparisons. The purpose of this study is to underscore the importance of including service quality in future work. This dimension of performance is especially important for the water and sewerage industry in developing countries, where poor coverage and low service quality characterize many nations. The results presented here show that it is necessary to incorporate the quality variables as additional output variables rather than as environmental variables. The ranking correlation is high between the models with or without the quality variables. However, rankings can change dramatically for specific utilities. Future research needs to address related problems: (1) What are the efficiency change, frontier change and quality change in the Peru water industry? (2) To what extent might a quasifixed capital cost model be more appropriate given the difficulty of actually adjusting capital in water sector (Garcia and Thomas, 2001 )? As more data become available, and additional studies are performed, economists will gain a better understanding of the role of quality in this sector.
